On Kidnapping Babies and Forcing them into the Experience Machine
A Critique of Preference Satisfaction Paternalism
Amongst paternalists today the theory of the good which is most popular is the preference satisfaction account. This permits its adherents such as Sarah Conly to maintain: ‘Paternalism will be limited in its use by some underlying commitments to the process of choice in some areas’. In the face of the reductio ad absurdums of forced marriage and a mandated career which the liberal puts forward, Conly maintains we prefer the condition of free choice in these areas because we derive intrinsic satisfaction from it even though state control may ensure better results for us in these areas otherwise, hence, we must be free in these areas. I question this rebuttal as many individuals may accept a forced marriage and a mandated career would make them better off, all things considered, but still object to such coercion, meaning, these individuals could still be forced into a marriage or career on paternalist grounds. Yet for the many people who really do derive an intrinsic satisfaction from free choice I admit the liberal reductios fail.
In this endeavour I wish to demonstrate how this theory of the good within paternalism still mandates state control on a vast scale, indeed, I will show it leads to the totalitarianism of kidnapping babies and forcing them into the experience machine, i.e., a contraption which creates a virtual reality for them where they live the “perfect life” for their whole existence. I take this totalitarianism to be unacceptable, hence, I urge the rejection of preference satisfaction paternalism and with it one of the main justifications for the nanny state today. In order to properly understand this critique of preference satisfaction paternalism I will now outline the preference satisfaction account itself and Robert Nozick’s experience machine.
The preference satisfaction account of the good maintains the good is the satisfaction of preferences and the best condition an individual can be in is to have all of their preferences satisfied. This account is espoused by thinkers such as A. J. Ayer, David Sobel and Sarah Conly, and, it is thought to be plausible partly because it overcomes a major problem associated with hedonism, i.e., it requiring everyone to inject as much heroin as possible, provided its high is sustained, because pleasure alone constitutes the good life. As before, the preference satisfaction account also fits our intuitions concerning how forced marriage and a mandated career actually make us worse off (or is said to anyway) as well. Roger Crisp has explained how a plausible conception of the preference satisfaction account must be both comprehensive and overarching as well, i.e., the good must be the total level of preference satisfaction over a life, not just the satisfaction of current preferences, and, be concerned with (second order) preferences for the shape and content of the (first order) preferences themselves too. Although this is confusing, I urge you to stick with it because my examples should make the relevant bits easier to understand.
The experience machine is a device ‘that would give you any experience that you desired’. Nozick explains the great advantages of it:
‘Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life's experiences?... Of course, while in the tank you won't know that you're there; you'll think it's all actually happening… Would you plug in?
The answers to these questions are obvious, or, at least, they are obvious to most people: No, you should not plug in, and, no, you would not plug in for that reason. According to Nozick this is because ‘we want to do certain things’, ‘we want to be a certain way’ and we want to be in contact with ‘deeper reality’. I agree with him. Leading your life in reality is a major part of what gives life value. This reasoning strikes a decisive blow to hedonism, which would advocate plugging into the machine, or, indeed, forcing people into it (Matrix style). Nevertheless, proponents of the preference satisfaction account such as Fred Feldman claim it ‘cuts no ice with respect to this theory’, because, people have an, all things considered, very strong preference for not entering the experience machine, meaning, the reductio against hedonism does not apply to the preference satisfaction account at all. I will now argue it does.
Excluding the preference for not entering the experience machine, all else equal, the life of the individual is better in the experience machine than in the real world (on the preference satisfaction account). This is because a person’s preferences are better satisfied in the experience machine than in the real world. To ensure the best for the person then, the proponent of the preference satisfaction account only needs to remove the preference to not enter it, and, hey presto, a person’s good will be maximised by stepping into it. Let’s accept conventional means of persuasion are unavailable though. What can the preference satisfaction paternalist do? I maintain they must kidnap babies and force them into the experience machine and never let them out, because, babies have no preference against entry into the experience machine and we have established it is only this preference which is stopping the highest level of preference satisfaction from being attained. This conclusion is unacceptable; hence, preference satisfaction paternalism is too and it must be rejected. Life should be led, not merely simulated. And with it goes the most sophisticated defence of the tobacco ban from Sarah Conly in her book, Against Autonomy, where she explicitly subscribes to ‘individual welfare construed as the maximization of the fulfilment of subjective ends’.
Let’s consider a few rebuttals to my contention. It may be argued the preferences which the neurobiologists create via electrodes are not real, hence, the maximisation of fake preferences in the experience machine is beaten by the partial fulfilment of real preferences in the real world. The problem with this rebuttal is its advocates would have to maintain it is always irrational to enter the experience machine, yet, earlier these advocates were arguing the only thing stopping people from going into the experience machine was their preference against it, meaning, they implicitly accepted it would make people better off, without the preference against entry, which is to concede real preferences exist within the experience machine which can be satisfied. Sobel claims a proper account of preference satisfaction requires people to be fully informed of all of the facts (presumably of the universe), and, perhaps, this would require the baby to be made aware of the fact his existence is in the experience machine. The baby would then reject being in the experience machine, when it grew up, all things considered, hence, maximising his preference satisfaction would actually require returning him to the real world. Thus, my reductio ad absurdum is overcome. I think this reply is blocked for the preference satisfaction account, because, the reply must accord intrinsic value to knowledge which contradicts the essence of the preference satisfaction account, i.e., value is solely being the satisfaction of preferences.
According to Crisp the reason the requirement of full information is inserted into the account is because it allows it to overcome counter-examples where the poor information of the person stops them from forming and fulfilling preferences which would increase their overall level of preference satisfaction, e.g., a monk who does not know of the modern world. I would agree such an individual is not maximally well-off, even if he fulfils all of his preferences, because, he could form a greater and stronger set of preferences which could be fulfilled in the modern world. Yet in the experience machine the knowledge of your existence within it, instigating your exit, would only permit the fulfilment of fewer and weaker preferences: Full information makes you worse off. Nevertheless, a slight addition to the thought experiment can clear up any remaining worries anyway. Assume the ‘superduper neuropsychologists’ can operate on the brain of the baby before it goes into the experience machine to ensure it never forms a preference to object to the experience machine. Under this qualification the experience machine is bound to maximise satisfaction as there is no preference which could possibly count against doing so.
My basic case against preference satisfaction paternalism is finished. Importantly, proponents of this form of paternalism admit they cannot rule out this reductio in advance, indeed, Conly is clear when she writes ‘there should be no a priori restrictions on behaviours that can be subject to coercive paternalism’. I now wish to further motivate Nozick’s reasons for rejecting entry into the experience machine therefore increasing the plausibility of the main intuition in this article. Doing things is objectively valuable; it is the reason why waking up from a dream of a great day is a disappointment compared to living the real thing; and, no, I would contend the vividness of the dream being low is not the distinguishing factor. Being a certain way, concerning the virtues, e.g., being courageous, kind or witty, requires the exertion of the will which simply cannot be simulated. Finally, connecting with reality, evidently, requires living within it, and, it is at least one of the reasons why perpetual stoners are condemned by people of an upright nature. I also believe it provides some explanation as to why your life is worse in some respect if your partner cheats on you behind your back, even if you never are affected by it; the cheating cuts you off from a proper understanding of reality.
An important point to be drawn from these three points is some freedom is intrinsically valuable as it is an integral part of living the good life, because, only with some freedom can we do things, e.g., live virtuously. From this judgement we can draw the conclusion that paternalism understood with the correct theory of the good will at least place a limit on restrictions on freedom in certain areas, because, failing to do this will ultimately be self-defeating. Any paternalism worth its salt will ultimately embrace an objective list theory of the good (a statement I would have dismissed in the past). Moreover, I should stress preference satisfaction paternalism has no respect for the person understood as that entity which chooses values, pursues projects and is continuous through time, for, no person is ever, arguably, permitted to come into existence. Watching point of view films does not make you into the person whose eyes you are watching them through; even if you garner exactly the same feelings as the original viewer.
Finally, I wish to gesture towards the immorality of forcing babies into the experience machine being largely due to it totally restricting their freedom, and, not to the badness of their lives which would result from it. Imagine a salesman for the experience machine is at a bar and talking to people who are into drugs about how great life is in it and offering free samples for life. Moreover, assume this salesman knows the life he is offering is ultimately bad. He has two means to unload his samples. First, he can persuade someone via his pitch which has a 10% chance of working, or, two, he can spike their drink which has a 10% chance of working and then drag them into the experience machine. Assume, for the moment, the overall level of preference satisfaction remains the same in both instances. Now, I would contend the immorality is much greater in the second case, which, given the negative effect and intention is the same in both, suggests, it is the restriction on freedom via the spiking which is the real issue. I would contend the same for the babies which are forced into the experience machine. What this shows is the core of paternalism, i.e., it is right to restrict the freedom of individuals to make bad choices, is deeply implausible; irrespective of the theory of the good which is inputted into it.
In sum, preference satisfaction paternalism requires kidnapping babies and forcing them into the experience machine; this is unacceptable; hence, preference satisfaction paternalism is unacceptable as well. Thus, a main justification for paternalist policies, such as safety belts, sugar taxes and the tobacco ban, is totally undermined. Individuals should be free to live their lives in their own way, which, inevitably, will involve them making mistakes and learning from them too. Ultimately, any moral theory which would gladly stop people from leading their lives imperfectly, simply to ensure they could experience them “perfectly”, is seriously defective, at best.
Fascinating! A couple of things spring to mind... The life span of a human in a flotation tank would, presumably, be greatly curtailed - muscles would atrophy, the body's largest organ - the skin - would be unable to generate vitamin D in the absence of sunlight and eating or drinking would be difficult, to saythe least... jus' sayin'...
The thing about paternalism is that it impacts men and women very differently... is acceptance of a status quo the same thing as having a preference for it? I would suggest not...