Many feminists argue mothers lose much of their autonomy in marriage due to the domination of men, arising from them being the breadwinner. In response to this they have argued the state should provide cash or in-kind benefits to better the bargaining hand of women to ensure they can continue to exercise their right to autonomy in relationships. In this endeavour I will argue individuals have no right to the autonomy to which feminists refer, and, importantly, even if the right did exist, financing its exercise would be impermissible because it would require seizing property which violates individual rights. Nonetheless, I show if feminists really want mothers to have more autonomy, they can simply recommend they marry low-status men, get a job, or both. Lastly, I address the idea structural injustice has led to less autonomy for women, the correction of which requires state benefits for mothers. Again, I find this solution objectionable for it requires violating individual rights.
Feminists contend men dominate women, i.e., exercise undue control over the lives of women, or, have the power to do so. Will Kymlicka identifies two areas of control which will concern us here, first, how job requirements are generally structured for the wants of men, and, second, how men control their wives within marriages. Since I maintain the concerns found in the first area stem from the concerns found in the second area, I will only address the latter. Before coming to what is wrong with domination according to the feminists it is worth pointing to a few instances of its results and how it arises. These may include women having to do the dishes, disproportionately look after the children, and do the standard chores of washing clothes, cooking and cleaning. This domination is said to arise because married women have a very poor exit option, due to their relatively poor marketable skills, meaning, men have more bargaining power in relationships. This is born out in the data which shows when divorce occurs the household income of women falls by 33%, while it only falls by 18% for households headed by men. Women with children are also seen as worse partners, which, all else equal, further diminishes their bargaining power by making them less attractive on the second-hand marriage market.
This domination within the family is said to be unwarranted because it undermines the autonomy of women, which Elizabeth Gross understands as ‘the right to accept or reject such norms or standards according to the appropriateness to one’s self-definition’. In other words, the domestic labour undertaken by women impedes them from developing their talents, abilities and leisure pursuits according to their own moulding. This autonomy is required to develop the good life, and, given ‘the deeper ideal of moral equality…[which] asserts that women’s interests and experiences should be equally important in shaping social life’, according to Kymlicka, it follows women should be entitled to more autonomy. In essential form the argument runs thus: Men dominate women in marriage, which deprives them of their autonomy, which violates the fundamental idea of moral equality between the sexes, which is wrongful action.
Susan Moller Okin claims this creates a ‘cycle of vulnerability’. Because women take time out of work to bring up children, men ended up earning more, which in turn makes it in the interests of the family to have the man be the breadwinner, which strengthens his bargaining hand more, and increasingly structures the economy around the interests of men. This latter factor then makes the productivity of women less, weakening their bargaining hand in marriages even more, even when they take a job. Janet Radcliffe Richards maintains this has resulted in the job requirements for employees not to be the main caregiver in the family, which, while not overtly sexist, makes the lives of women much harder as they usually fulfil this role. Catherine Mackinnon even claims this structuring of society around men means ‘an affirmative action plan is in effect, otherwise known as the structure and values of American society’. Now I have outlined the feminist case in (I hope) a robust manner we can turn to its critique from a libertarian perspective.
I maintain individuals have no right to the type of autonomy to which feminists refer and hence women are not wronged when they are deprived of it within marriages due to “domination”. Consider these examples of power being exercised to control people, where the cost of exiting from the relationship or situation is high, typically what feminists would call domination, which are all permissible and not wrongful in the slightest.
First, consider Eric, a low-status man, dating Melissa, an absolute stunner. In order to be successful in wooing her hand he may have to change his behaviour significantly, e.g., by working harder at his job, improving his fitness, dress sense, and increasing his savings to buy them a house. Melissa has dominated Eric here because her implicit threat of exiting, her strong bargaining hand, has significantly changed his behaviour. Eric is no longer able to continue the bachelor life he once did. Second, consider Bob who is without transport to the train station ten miles away, where he needs to be at 8am everyday in order to get to work, having been made redundant in his former local job. Assume he cannot drive for a year due to a broken foot. His neighbour, Jim, offers him a ride, but for the 6am train he takes, and, due to the inconvenience he asks him to get his shopping and take out his bins for him every week. Bob accepts the offer, but due to the looming threat of not being taken to the station he has to make large changes to his life, i.e., by doing as Jim has asked him. Finally, consider Richard, who never washes himself, stinks, and is lonely. His sole friend, Derek, offers to introduce him to various people at parties and dinners, but he attaches the condition he must wash himself when he does so. Again, Derek’s threat to not assist unless Richard complies is excising power over him to alter his behaviour.
In all these instances the fact the behaviour of Eric, Bob and Richard is significantly changed by the threats arising for the strong bargaining hand of Melissa, Jim and Derek respectively does not mean the latter group wrongs the former group. Analogously, the fact the behaviour of wives is significantly changed, e.g., in having to do the dishes, washing and raise children, by the threats arising from the stronger bargaining hand of husbands is not wrongful either. For this reason, it cannot be argued individuals have a right to autonomy, because that would require for there to be wronging in all these instances, which there is not. Nonetheless, autonomy, understood in part as Joel Feinberg put it, as not being reliant on ‘the commitment of others’ and, therefore, not subject to the influence of the will of anyone else, is certainly diminished in these all instances, it must be admitted.
Yet I would agree with Feinberg when he claims ‘even a refined conception of autonomy will be at best a partial ideal’, in part because it may often be acceptably traded off for other goods, such cash transfers in marriages, according to the disposition of the individual, as the above example shows. Feminists must appreciate what John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, his wife, make clear in the 19th Century concerning women:
‘[W]hen a woman marries, it may in general be understood that she makes the choice of the management of the household, and the bringing up of a family, the first call on her exertions, during as many years of her life as may be required for the purpose, and that she renounces, not all other objects and occupations, but all which are not consistent with the requirement of this’.
Although today I think men should be upfront as to what they wish for in terms of cooking and cleaning (in exchange, of course, for cash transfers, and, best to reel her in a bit first). Perhaps there should also be contractual arrangements for these sorts of things, I have read it makes both partners happier. I also hope women today will accept the advice of C. Northcote Parkinson when he writes ‘they can exert more influence by an attractive diffidence than they will ever achieve by militant assertion’, as modern feminists would insist on, provided, obviously, they are not married to a progressive type. This clarity of commitment and attractive diffidence should result in a happy marriage, even if the wife is slightly less autonomous than the husband. (Where this ‘attractive difference’ ranks compared to getting a job in ensuring wifely autonomy, I do not know). Anyway, returning to the political theory of this endeavour.
Additionally, if it is thought to be acceptable to give mothers benefits to strengthen their bargaining hand, analogously, it should be acceptable to give Eric benefits to strengthen his bargaining hand too. This is absurd, and, hence, so is the idea of subsidising autonomy. Now it may be claimed the reasoning here is disanalogous because individuals only have a right to so much autonomy and this right is violated in the marriage case, but the right is not violated in the dating case. Perhaps. Yet if this is so feminists must specify where they draw the line and why: It will not do to argue the impact on mothers to not having benefits will be large on their lifestyle, yet this will not be the case for bachelors such as Eric. This is because we may simply ask how big an impact is needed to warrant benefits, and, disregarding this point, there will remain a bachelor whose behaviour would have to change so significantly for him to get the gal, who may be his only true love, benefits for him would be warranted to stop her domination of him: An implausible result to say the least.
It should be noted Jean Jacque Rousseau had similar worries about autonomy in the late 18th Century as our feminists do today: He proposed total equality as where to draw the line. His solution was to ensure everyone had equal holdings of land, could not amass any wealth and would not desire much at all. He writes: ‘[T]o justify the right of the first occupant to any piece of land whatsoever, the following conditions must obtain…that the claimant occupies no more than for his subsistence’. He maintained it was only under these conditions no one would be subject to the domination of others, as everyone could grow their own food and be entirely independent of everyone else. Yet even here there would remain domination because attractive women would be able to command the behaviour of men in exchange for their love. Once again, a Leftist agenda is frustrated by the nature of mankind being always to fall into a hierarchy.
When feminists assert they wish to ensure ‘[a]utonomy…[as] the right to accept or reject such norms or standards according to their appropriateness to one’s self-definition’, they really should add, ‘at a very low cost to the woman in question’. This is why they demand such measures as redistributing domestic labour, making cash payments to mothers, e.g., child benefit, or providing free childcare. All of these measures would increase their level of autonomy as the absence of reliance on others, and, hence, increase their bargaining hand relative to husbands, meaning they would be able to pursue their careers, hobbies and interests with greater intensity than before.
These policies are not permissible because they would necessitate violating individual rights by depriving people of their property via taxation. No individual should be used as the mere means to make the lives of others better off, instead, each should be free to pursue his own life in his own way. As Robert Nozick has argued, just as it would be wrong for a woman to conscript a person into providing their childcare to increase their autonomy, it would be wrong for a woman to force a person to give up their income so they can hire childcare to increase their autonomy too. Although there are important ethical distinctions between the two examples, an essential element remains between them, the unconsensual acquisition of personal energy: Both are forced to work for the purposes of others.
If women wish to become mothers they should bear the full cost of their choice (with their husband), not expect others to pick up the bill to reduce the price of the lifestyle. It is tough luck this will typically result in them having a weaker bargaining hand in marriages, again, mothers are not entitled to the fruits working people create. Why should someone earning money to buy a washing machine be deprived of the sweat of his brow, to make payments to the housewife so she can afford one, or, increase her bargaining hand enough so she can get her husband to do the washing up. Feminists proposing these redistributive schemes are in effect looking for someone else to do the domestic chores. This unacceptable. If wives are receiving cash payments from their husbands it is their duty to reciprocate via household labour (unless alternative arrangements have been made).
However, feminists who believe women should become more autonomous nonetheless, but admit the impermissibility of using the tax system to finance the condition, can recommend marrying males who do not earn much and or having their own jobs. Consider a mother who was once a well-paid lawyer, if she married a minimum wage sales assistant her bargaining hand would be very strong, because the fallback position of divorce would see her household income only fall slightly, or maybe even increase if she went back to work and hired childcare. Generally, women who marry down male status hierarchies (which strongly correlate with income) will have more power in relationships, and, therefore, the ability to ensure more of their autonomy than if they marry up status hierarchies, because their bargaining hand will be stronger in each case. I should add all these observations are ceteris paribus.
The issue with this solution for women wanting more autonomy though is it denies them want they really want, which is to have their cake and eat it too. Ideally, women would like to choose the alpha male while at the same time wanting the bargaining hand of the wife married to an omega male. Or at least this is true for the sort of woman who goes on about girl power. As I have shown, without the intervention of the state, or a pushover of a husband, or advanced contracts, this is not possible. In most cases women choose to opt for having the weaker bargaining hand and the higher status husband. Presumably this is because they prefer the greater goods and security which come with a high-status husband, to the low-status husband who comes with fewer goods and less security, even when they do get more autonomy as a result. Although recently, at least in the UK, this has become less of the case, for whatever reason. Obviously, one of the reasons many women may not mind having the weaker bargaining hand is because husbands typically love them. Their power is exercised benevolently, or, better still, the good of each is largely made up by the good of each other, so there is no conflict of their interests.
At this point it should be clear there is no warrant for the state to give mothers benefits, indeed, for it to do so would be an injustice. Nonetheless, there remains an argument by the feminists which libertarians should be at least sympathetic to. It is alluded to by Janet Radcliffe Richards:
‘We know for certain that women have been kept out of many kinds of work, and this means that the work is quite likely to be unsuited to them…I am firmly convinced that if women had been fully involved in the running of society from the start they would have found a way of arranging work and children to fit each other. Men have had no such motivations, and we can see the results’
I think the most plausible argument which can be extracted from the above is this. Due to past injustice against women, e.g., their exclusion from the professions and universities and their legal inability as married women to own property, the institutions of today are shaped to benefit men, which is structural injustice. Given the premise structural injustice should be eliminated, and much of this is simply embodied in women having weaker bargaining hands in relationships, it follows the aforementioned benefits should be put in place (or kept in place) in order to address this problem. I think an example will help to clarify this argument.
Imagine a law firm requires partners always be on call, which means mothers are simply unable to take the job up. Radcliffe Richards claims if it were not for laws in the past excluding women from the legal profession then the law firm would have established arrangements and contracts which would allow women to become partners. Restoring mothers to where they would have been without structural injustice then requires providing free childcare which would allow them to become partners. The same argument will go for most of the professions from which women were excluded. There are at least two reasons as to why this argument does not justify the widespread benefits feminists wish for.
First, until the Industrial Revolution the vast majority of people were employed in agriculture, where as far as I am aware, there was no legal restrictions of the employment of women. Even during the 19th Century when more and more people were employed in manufacturing, women did not face serious restrictions on their employment prospects. So, we are really only dealing with the professions, which, again, only increased in numbers significantly towards the end of the 19th Century. Moreover, much legislation was passed in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries ending the exclusion of women from these professions, e.g., the Sexual Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919 which allowed women to practise in the law. All of this means most jobs today are unlikely to have been shaped much by the injustice of state compelled discrimination in the past, thus, even on their own grounds, feminists cannot argue for widespread benefits to women and mothers to mitigate structural injustice.
Second, if we take structural injustice to be the disadvantages which come to individuals due to the interaction of legal, social and economic systems, relative to the perfectly just systems, I would still maintain very few benefits are owed to women and mothers anyway. This is because individuals remain entitled to their property even if it has arisen from the effects of injustice. Take these two examples to demonstrate this point. Funeral parlours make profits every year from the injustice of murder, yet we do not require them to compensate the family for the disadvantages. Equally, home insurers make profit every year from the presence of crime, yet we do not require them to compensate those who are robbed and thieved from. In both instances we accept the businesses should not be taxed to compensate the victims of injustice, analogously then, nor should the male partners in the law firm, who have behaved entirely within justice today, be taxed for the injustice the state did in the 19th Century in excluding women, even if they benefit from it (due to higher wages and better job prospects). Given the beneficiaries of injustice are the only sources of revenue which may have been permissible to tax to correct the structural injustice, and they are not permissibly taxed, it follows there is simply no fund for which women and mothers can be compensated from. (Although in the 1990s some Edwardian politicians could have been forced to make restitution to women.)
I must confess I am surprised to say this myself, but perhaps we must just live with structural injustice, because to seize property from its owners to correct it would itself be an injustice, and, hence, be impermissible, even if it did reduce injustice overall. After all, few of a liberal disposition would take the view property could be seized from the innocent to compensate those who have been stolen from themselves: Which in effect forces everyone to buy content insurance.
In sum, it should be clear there is no right to the autonomy to which feminists refer, hence, there remains no reason for the state to finance it, via child benefit, free childcare, or simple cash payments. Moreover, even accepting this right to autonomy exists, ensuring its exercisability via providing mothers benefits would still be impermissible because the necessary taxation required violates property rights. Additionally, mitigating any significant structural injustice against mothers, the existence of which is highly doubtful, would be impermissible too, because again it would require violating individual rights by seizing property. Nonetheless, all else equal, we have established if feminists really want to have more autonomy in their motherly lives the solution is clear: Marry low-status men, get a job, or both. In arguing for the “right” to autonomy, and the taxation to finance its exercise, feminists are effectively looking to unload the burden of emptying the dishwasher onto men, this is wrong, and hence I say to them: Unload the dishwasher yourself.
I tend to agree. Nobody obliges most women to marry or to procreate - such things are career choices. Those who have found their true vocation would cheerfully dedicate themselves to it in exchange for little more than food and shelter, in my opinion.